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STATEMENT OF FACTS:
a.

The parties were divorced in 1985.

The divorce

decree provides for a division of the retirement benefits of the
parties, ( See Divorce Decree of December 16, 1985.)
b.

In 1986 the parties by stipulation modified the

retirement provisions of the divorce decree.(See Stipulation and
Order In Re Modification of Decree of January 8, 1986.)
c.

The Civil Service Office of Personnel Management,

announced the termination of participants right to take part of
their retirement as a lump sum prior to receiving regular monthly
payments. Retirees had to actually retire before December 1, 1990
or else lose the right to take the lump sum option. Mr. Montgomery
determined that he desired to take the lump sum option. (Transcript
Page 21 Line 21.)
d.

In October of 1989 Mr. Montgomery approached Mrs.

Montgomery about both of them agreeing to allow the other to take
their retirement partially through a lump sum.

Mrs. Montgomery

informed him she had already taken her retirement, but agreed to
allow him the same right.

She signed a document (Defendant's

Exhibit 1) consenting that Mr. Montgomery take a portion of his
retirement using the lump sum option prior to receiving monthly
payments. (Transcript Page 28 Line 15; Page 12 Line 24.)
e.

Mr. Montgomery informed Mrs. Montgomery that if she

did not agree to his taking a partial lump sum portion of his
retirement he could not retire at that time. He informed her that
5

he would have to work approximately 10 additional years before
retiring in order to earn enough additional retirement benefits to
pay her the $400 a month previously ordered if he was going to keep
the standard of living he wanted in retirement. (Transcript Page 24
Line 8ff; Page 8 Line 18ff; Page 34 Line 19-24.)
f.
retirement

Mr. Montgomery

and the payment

retirement benefits.

filed

the

documents

requesting

of his lump sum as part of his

He was informed by Civil Service that the

Qualified Domestic Relations Order on file would have to be
modified before his request could be granted. (Transcript Page 23
Line 15.)
g.

In the summer of 1990 the parties through counsel

began negotiation of a stipulation to modify the existing QDRO.
The

parties

had

no

direct

contact

except

through

counsel.

(Transcript Page 9 Line 8.)
h. Mr. Montgomery never told the former Mrs. Montgomery
that if she accepted a portion of the lump sum that Mr. Montgomery
would receive no further retirement benefits.

The former Mrs.

Montgomery upon advice of her counsel and after her independent
investigation of her rights opted to execute the stipulation that
became the basis of the court's order modifying the Qualified
Domestic Relations Order.
i.

(Transcript Page 11 to Page 13.)

Mr. Montgomery retired and processed his claim for

benefits in accordance with the QDRO agreed upon by the parties and
reduced to an order by the court.
j.

Mrs. Snitchler shortly thereafter informed Civil
6

Service that the lump sum retirement benefit should not be allowed.
The

lump

sum

Montgomery.

was

only

recently

partially

received

by

Mr.

He has tendered to Mrs. Montgomery her portion of the

retirement benefits under the lump sum.

She has refused to accept

it. (Transcript Page 38 Line 8.)
k.

Mr. Montgomery cannot go back to work and lacks the

income to live on if required to now pay his former spouse $400.00
per month.

Mr. Montgomery relied to his detriment

Montgomery's execution of the stipulation and order.
based upon the order.

on Mrs.

He retired

He cannot now get his job back.

He has

planned his retirement on the income he negotiated to receive.
(Transcript Page 24 Line 8ff.)
1. Mrs. Montgomery brought the present action to modify
the QDRO to give her monthly benefits.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
An order for retirement was negotiated.

The proposition

presented to Mrs. Snitchler was accept a portion of the partial
lump sum payment now or Mr. Montgomery must wait about ten years to
accumulate enough retirement benefits to achieve the standard of
living for retirement he wants.
There is no substantial change of circumstance,
compelling reason to overturn a stipulated decree.
POINT II
7

there is no

There was no misrepresentation. A misrepresentation is an act
of untruth or concealment.

Mrs. Snitchler acted on the advice of

her counsel after her own independent investigation. Neither Mrs.
Snitchler nor her counsel say they relied on Mr. Montgomery or his
counsel.
Mrs. Snitchler chose some money now rather than wait for a
monthly income stream in the future. There is no evidence that Mr.
Montgomery misrepresented anything to her.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERTURNING A STIPULATED ORDER.
The fundamental, telling fact of the present case is that the
parties entered a voluntary stipulation negotiated through counsel
that was received and approved by the court.

The parties in the

present case never spoke with each other after October of 1989.
All of the negotiations that took place from September through
November of 1990 were done through the parties respective counsel.
The general rule is that once a matter is litigated and
resolved it is res

judicata.

The court in Land

v Land

605

P.2d

1248 (Utah 1980) after observing that the rules of equity apply to
divorce matters said:
when a decree is based upon a property
agreementf forged by the parties and sanctioned by the
court,
equity
must
take
such
agreement
into
consideration.
Equity is not available to reinstate
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply
because one has come to regret the bargain made.
Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction

8

of the court where a property settlement has been
incorporated into the decree, and the outright abrogation
of the provisions of such an agreement is only to be
resorted to with great reluctance and for compelling
reasons. (Citations deleted.)
The Utah Court has consistently said a finality must be given
to matters previously settled.

In the present case there is a

stipulation entered by the parties.

The stipulation contains

specific language that this is a final and complete resolution of
all matters relating to retirement between the parties.

Mrs.

Snitchler knew and understood that this was the intent of the
stipulation.

(Transcript Page 33 Line 22 to Page 34 Line 9.)

The initial proposed stipulation presented to Mrs. Snitchler
for her consideration, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, essentially gave the
lump sum amount to Mr. Montgomery and gave Mrs. Snitchler her
approximately $400.00 per month. The stipulation accepted by Mrs.
Snitchler waives her right in the monthly payments and grants her
a

percentage

in

the

partial

lump

sum.

There

was

no

misunderstanding of the import or intent of the stipulation. Both
Mrs.

Snitchler

and

her

counsel

understood

the

two options.

(Transcript Page 14 Line 10 - 18.)
Nothing has changed in the circumstances of the parties since
the entry of the new QDRO.

The full effect and intent of the

stipulation was carried out. Mr. Montgomery retired based upon the
stipulation.

There must be some change of circumstance to justify

a modification.
The Utah Supreme Court strongly stated the necessity of a
change of circumstance in Kessimakis

9

v Kessimakis,

580 P.2d

1090

(Utah

1978).
This Court is clearly committed to the proposition
that in order to modify a prior decree the moving party
must show a substantial change in circumstance. In the
absence of such a showing, the decree shall not be
modified and the matters previously litigated and
incorporated therein cannot be collaterally attacked in
face of the doctrine of res judicata.
Consequently,
[the] attempt to challenge the equity of the original
decree cannot be tolerated.
In the present case the stipulation and the subsequent order

did exactly what the parties anticipated it would. Mrs. Snitchler
was entitled to exactly what she bargained for.

But for, her own

complaint to the Office of Personnel Management and her subsequent
dissatisfaction with the bargain she struck she would have received
exactly what she was promised.

(Transcript Page 38 Line 8.)

When Mr. Montgomery finally received his lump sum payment he
tendered the 27% amount as agreed.
still refusing to take the payment.

Mrs.

Snitchler has and is

(Transcript Page 6 Line 25 to

Page 7 Line 2; Page 38 Line 15.)
Mrs. Snitchler had no obligation to sign the stipulation and
allow Mr. Montgomery to retire and take the partial lump sum
retirement option.

Mr.

Montgomery in 1989 had explained to her

and as did his counsel later through Mr. Kunz that Montgomery would
not retire early if he had to pay $400.00 per month.

The choice

presented to Mrs. Snitchler was take a lump sum now or wait perhaps
as many as ten years to receive anything.
time dead line.
1990

the

There was an extreme

If the papers were not completed by November 30,

option was

gone

forever.

10

She chose

to

sign the

stipulation and take a portion of the lump sum and waive any right
to the monthly payments.

(Transcript Page 36 Line 18 to Page 37

Line 1.)
Nothing has changed since the parties negotiated the new order
except Mrs. Snitchler has become dissatisfied with her bargain.
She now wants to go back and get more after Mr.

Montgomery has

irretrievably altered his position by retiring in reliance on the
order agreed to by the parties.
It would be unjust in the extreme to allow Mrs. Snitchler to
go back on her word.

The plain language of the stipulation and

order waives any right to future monthly payments.

Both she and

her attorney understood that was the meaning of the documents. She
got exactly what she bargained for.
This is a case where the parties entered a stipulation that
was negotiated by counsel and approved by the court.
understood intent was carried out.

Mrs.

Its full,

Snitchler wants a

modification simply because of dissatisfaction with the amount of
money.

She understands that if she can get a percentage of the

monthly payments in an amount of $400.00 per month rather than a
percentage of the lump sum she is likely to make much more from the
labor of her ex-husband. The difficulty is that Montgomery retired
now, only because of her inducement to limit what she received to
a percentage of the lump sum.
The reason to change a stipulated, court reviewed and approved
order must be compelling and not just because one party is upset
about value.

Mitchell

v Mitchell,

11

527

P.2d

1359

(Utah

1974).

When the parties have had the opportunity to have a determination
of their issues then they become res judicata.
Jacobson

applies to divorce decrees.
(Utah

The doctrine also

v Jacobson,

703 P.2d

303

1985).

It should also be noted that no where in the court's ruling do
the words "substantial change of circumstance" occur. (Transcript
Page 46 Line 23 to Page 52.)

POINT II
THERE WAS NO MISREPRESENTATION.
The trial court found that Mr. Montgomery misrepresented the
facts to his ex-wife. The trial court hangs the whole modification
on a misrepresentation.

The court states its finding as follows:

And I think in that process, the defendant
deliberately misrepresented to both — to the plaintiff
what the benefit was, and never at any time was it
conveyed to the plaintiff what the actual entitlement
was, that is, that there was a lump sum payment of the
29,774 plus the $1776 per month. Apparently that's not
even determined until March 14th, 1991 when Mr.
Montgomery signs the document at that time agreeing that
that's what he is to receive. (Transcript Page 49 Line
15-22.)
It is hard to imagine how the trial court reached the
conclusion that Mr. Montgomery misrepresented anything to his exwife.

The court focuses on the problem.

How could the defendant

misrepresent something in October of 1989 when he was not even
informed until March 14, 1991.
When pressed for what the misrepresentation was, the court
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responded,
The misrepresentation goes clear back to the time on
October 10th of 1990 when they were signing the agreement
where the representation was that the total retirement
was $29,774. And that was a total lump sum settlement.
And so she had a 20 — in effect, a certain percentage of
that. and that was a misrepresentation. All right.
That's all. (Transcript Page 51 Line 20 to Page 52 Line
1.)
This makes no sense. In October of 1989 they met to each sign
the necessary papers for the other to take the partial lump sum
retirement option.

Mrs.

Snitchler signed the paper and informed

Mr. Montgomery that she had already obtained hers without his
signature.

Defendant's Exhibit 1 is the document she signed.

There is nothing arcane or obscure about it. It is the request for
retirement

that

every

Civil

Service

employee

including Mrs.

Snitchler had to sign.
The Office of Personnel Management sent back Mr. Montgomery's
request with the statement that there was an existing Qualified
Domestic Relations Order that had to be modified first before
Montgomery

could

be

allowed

the

partial

lump

sum

option.

(Transcript Page 23 Line 15 - 19.)
No where does Mrs. Snitchler's make the allegation that Mr.
Montgomery

told

her that

the partial

lump

sum was

all the

retirement she would receive. There is no evidence for the court's
finding of a misrepresentation.

She affirmatively states what the

October 1989 government document was for.

"The reason for this

paper was that he could receive his lump sum just as I, and there
was no other comments."

(Transcript Page 32 Line 2 - 3 . )

The misrepresentation was said to begin at the meeting in
13

front of the notary when the parties were to sign each other's
documents for the partial lump sum distribution.

Mrs. Snitchler

informed Montgomery that he did not have to sign because she
already had her lump sum. (Transcript Page 31 Line 1 - 8 . )

After

that time the parties had no further conversations.
Mrs. Snitchler thereafter only communicated with her exhusband through counsel.

She made her decision as to whether or

not to sign a new QDRO based upon her consultations with her
attorney.

Neither Mrs. Snitchler nor her counsel relied on Mr.

Montgomery nor his counsel for any understanding of anything. The
stipulation its self clearly says that she will not receive
anything

from

the

future

monthly

understanding this fact as well.

payments.

She

admits

to

(Transcript Page 12 Line 24 to

Page 13 Line 1.)
It is hard to believe that she did not understand that Mr.
Montgomery was going to receive a monthly amount for retirement in
addition to the lump sum annuity.

She had only recently gone

through the same retirement process.

(Transcript Page 31 Line 1 -

8.)
Mrs. Snitchler never makes the allegation that Mr. Montgomery
told her anything one way or the other.

These people simply did

not talk. It cannot be claimed that the misrepresentation was made
vicariously through counsel.

Mrs. Snitchler relied on her own

counsel who made his own independent investigation of the facts and
advised her accordingly.

(Transcript Page 10 Line 13 to Page 13

Line 4.)
14

Not

even

Mr. Kunz

claims

to

having

received

misleading information from opposing counsel.
misrepresentation.

false

or

So where is the

The strongest statement made by Mr. Kunz, is

that "after that conversation (with government retirement officers)
that I had a brief conversation with Mr. Hughes wherein I think I
informed him of the information I had received from Washington."
(Transcript Page 12 Line 8 - 11.)
Mrs. Snitchler had at her command all of her own retirement
package, which would have included Defendant's Exhibit 1, anything
she cared to request from the Hill Air Force Base Personnel Office,
anything she cared to request from the Civil Service Office of
Personnel Management, any advice she cared to request from her
counsel. The source of the information upon which Mr. Kunz relied
in giving his advice was Washington.

"[A]nd that stipulation was

prepared in accordance with the information that Washington had
provided me..." (Transcript Page 13 Line 8.)

How can it be said

Mr. Montgomery misrepresented anything to her?

The stipulation in

unmistakable terms states that Mrs. Snitchler by signing the
stipulation waives all rights in any and all annuities or monthly
payments.

It is important to note that no where is there language

in the stipulation that would lead to the conclusion that Mr.
Montgomery was not going to get regular monthly payments.
The ultimate decision to sign and induce Mr. Montgomery to
take an early retirement was Mrs. Snitchler's. Mrs. Snitchler had
an absolute right not to sign the stipulation. Had she chosen not
to, the pre-existing QDRO would have remained in force and effect.
15

The difference would have been that Mr. Montgomery would have
continued working and accumulating retirement benefits until his
retirement would have reached a level on which he felt he could
retire comfortably and still pay his ex.
monthly payment

of approximately

Had she decided the

$400.00 per month was more

important than getting her share of the partial lump sum now she
could have simply not signed the stipulation.
Mrs. Snitchler is trying to get the best of both worlds at Mr.
Montgomery's expense.

She would not have received retirement

benefits now unless she agreed to the stipulation.
been a misrepresentation it is Mrs. Snitchler.

If there has

She promised a

division of the retirement benefit and got counsel and the court as
well as Mr. Montgomery to go along.

Now she wants to rescind her

promise after Mr. Montgomery has changed his position and retired.
The present

case

is an incident where the trial court

overturned a stipulated and court approved modification to a
divorce decree. It is inconceivable that Mr. Montgomery could have
misrepresented anything to his ex-wife.

The simple fact is they

did not speak. The parties both had the same employer namely Hill
Air Force Base.

Mrs. Snitchler went through the same retirement

process herself just before she signed the government's standard
form for spousal consent to the partial lump sum distribution. She
knew the people in personnel.

She had gotten the forms necessary

to get her own retirement benefits. How could the trial court find
Montgomery misrepresented anything to her?
But even if something Mr. Montgomery said could be construed
16

to be a misrepresentation the Office of Personnel Management did
not accept the simple signature without a new qualified domestic
relations order replacing the one they had on file.
Mrs.

Snitchler

made

an

intelligent

decision

based

on

considerations such as her health and that of her ex-husband as to
whether she should take a substantial lump sum payment now or wait
for possibly ten years to begin receiving a monthly payment.

She

chose the immediacy of the lump sum in consultation with her
attorney.

She induced Mr. Montgomery to retire.

Mr. Montgomery radically changed his position by leaving his
employment and retiring.

He did so on the basis of the promises

made by his ex in the stipulation and in reliance on the court's
order made pursuant to the stipulation.

Mr. Montgomery would not

have retired but for his ex-wife's promises.
Mr. Montgomery's position is forever altered to his detriment
by Judge Cornaby's modification.

He can not go back to work but

is stuck in living on an income that does not meet his needs
because of the court altering a stipulation that was negotiated at
arms length and in good faith.
It appears that the court was determined to reach a result the
law would not allow and therefore found a misrepresentation. There
is simply no evidence of a misrepresentation. Equity requires that
Mr. Montgomery be restored to the benefit of his bargain. The cost
to him of upholding the trial court's decision is simply too great.

17

CONCLUSION
There is no change of circumstance to justify a modification
of the decree.

To change a negotiated

arms length counsel

negotiated order there must be a compelling reason.
There was no misrepresentation.

A misrepresentation implies

an act or statement made to mislead or some how deceive.

In this

case the record is barren of any such allegations.
Mr. Montgomery desires the court to reverse the trial court
and restore the negotiated Qualified Domestic Relations Order to
force and effect and allow him to pay his ex-wife the percentage of
the lump sum the two of them bargained for.
Dated this 22 day of May, 1992.

Donald Cl Hilghe
Attorney for Deffen&afiit/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES, that they have caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the
following person(s), by placing same in the United States Postal
Service, postage pre-paid, May 22, 1992:
Brian Florence
818 26th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
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APPENDIX

VYC navy since oeen able to correct that.
2

They have

returned those amounts to Mr. Montgomery.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HUGHES:

What amounts?
The amounts they were taking.

They were

5

collecting out of his monthly retirement.

6

approximately about, I guess, almost a third of his monthly

7

retirement to pay back that lump sum amount.

8

had that restored, I think as of December.

9

They were taking

He has since

We're in a position to pay her the $8100

10

immediately, and he can do that and is proposed to do that.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. HUGHES:

Out of money he's got, you mean?
Right; which would represent the amount of

13

her percentage of the lump sum share that she was to receive.

14

He has the ability now to pay that.

15

That's been resolved.

So that's what we're going to present, your Honor,

16

that these people negotiated a result that achieved that

17

result, and both, Mr. Montgomery in particular, radically

18

modified his position where he can't go back to where things

19

were before.

20

stuck with the agreement they've entered into.

21

And we're asking the Court to just —

THE COURT:

they're

Now, Mr. Florence, I understand when you

22

filed this, there was the claim being made that they weren't

23

going to pay anything to your client.

24

I

MR. FLORENCE:

25

I

THE COURT:

That's correct.

And your client's now taking the position

D\t[[ij
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2

MR. FLORENCE:

Well, no.

She does not want the 8100.

3

She made an agreement to settle for the lump sum agreement.

4

But when she made that agreement, she was under the

5

impression that neither he nor she if he elected to take the

6

lump sum payment would be entitled to an additional monthly

7

annuity retirement payment beyond that.

8

that election.

9

She knowingly made

But after she made the election and after she could

10

not get her $8100, it was then that she discovered not only

11

did he get his portion of the lump sum retirement but he is

12

also getting a monthly annuity, something that she did not

13

believe was possible when she made the agreement in the first

14

place.

15

made the agreement that she did.

Had she known that was the case, she would not have

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. FLORENCE:

18

Okay.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Call your first witness.

I call Mr. Kunz.

PAUL T. KUNZ,

19

called as a witness at the request of Plaintiff,

20

having been first duly sworn, was examined and

21

testified as follows:

22
23
24
25

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FLORENCE:
Q

Would you state your name and give a business

address, please.

xoLSiti ^Tjlckzn

Court Reporter

, ^^^wv. ^ w ,

2

Ogden, Utah.

3

Q

4

Z.UUJ

wcisnington

Boulevard,

And you are a lawyer licensed to practice law in

the state of Utah?

5

A

I am,

6

Q

And have been for many years?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Mr. Kunz, did you in the course of your profession

9

For 35 years.

have an occasion to meet with and advise Hilde B. Montgomery

10

Snitchler?

11

A

Yes, I did.

12

Q

And did that occur sometime during the middle of

A

Yes.

13
14

1990?
I believe she first called me in August of

15

1990, and we met, I believe, the first time in regard to the

16

matter in September of 1990.

17

Q

When she met with you, what was her concern?

18

A

She told me that her husband had agreed that when

19

she retired from the government that she could receive a lump

20

sum settlement, which she had received.

21

her husband approached her and asked her if she would consent

22

to his taking a lump sum settlement, and that he had to take

23

it within a certain date or that he couldn't do it.

She informed me that

24

I said that —

She said that Mr. Hughes had prepared a

25

| stipulation in regard to the payment of the lump sum
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And he

1

settlement to her husband and that she wanted me to review

2

that and see if that was in her interest to sign that or not

3

sign it.

4

prepared with it would be the qualified domestic relations

5

order that would be sent to the government and dispose of the

6

matter.

And if she did sign it, then the order that he

7

Q

Did you review a stipulation for her?

8

A

Yes.

9

I received a —

Excuse m e — letter from

Mr. Hughes dated September 11th, 1990.

I received a document

10

marked "Stipulation For Qualified Domestic Relations Order"

11

bearing the date of August blank at the signature along with

12

a qualified domestic relations order, both of them marked

13

"original" in the event that we elected to use them.

14

them here in my file.

15

Q

I have

And in that regard, let me show you what also been

16

marked at Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and ask you if that is the

17

copy of the stipulation that was sent to you.

18
19
20
21

A

Yes.

That is the copy of the stipulation that was

also either sent to me or to Mrs. Snitchler.
Q

Was the stipulation identified as Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1 ever signed by anyone?

22

A

No, this was not signed by anyone.

23

Q

Did that stipulation in addition to allowing

24
25

Mr. Montgomery to receive his lump sum preserve for
I Mrs. Snitchler a portion of his monthly retirement benefit?

1

A

Yes, it did.

It retained whatever benefit she

2

previously had under the prior domestic relations order and

3

was to release only to him as I understood and read it the

4

lump sum provision.

5
6
7

Q

Did you question the legality or permissibility of

that arrangement?
A

Yes.

I was concerned about that because it didn't

8

appear to me that $8100 which was the proposed share of the

9

lump sum was reasonable in relationship to the alternative of

10
11
12
13

receiving a monthly benefit of $400 per month.
Q

What inquiry, if any, did you make concerning the

permissibility of entering into the first stipulation?
A

Well, I told Mrs. Snitchler that I couldn't approve

14

entering into such a stipulation unless I found out more

15

about it.

16

government retirement programs, that I did understand that

17

the employee paid in certain amounts himself as a

18

contribution and that the government made contributions and

19

that I would suppose that you could withdraw your own

20

contributions, but that I wasn't certain.

21

entering into any such agreement, I thought we should contact

22

the government personnel.

23

And I told her that I was not familiar with the

And before

And at that time, I asked her the names of people

24

she dealt with at Hill Field, and she gave me the names of

25

some parties.

And I talked to them, and I did not get any

1

satisfaction.

2

So I made a later appointment with her, and it was

3

on October 12th, 1990, my telephone log shows.

4

Hill Field again and asked them for the people that I would

5

contact to find out more information on this.

6

a telephone number for the Office of Personnel Management

7

court order benefits section in Washington, D.C.

8
9

And I called

And I received

And I called the first number and talked to a
person there that did not give me any satisfaction but

10

referred me to the second number.

11

17 minutes to the party at the second number.

12

that party of the Social Security numbers of the two parties

13

which I had in the order and stipulation and the general

14

circumstances, and that my concern was, umm, if the person

15

consented to the lump sum distribution, would it affect the

16

monthly retirement benefit distribution.

17

My log shows that I talked
And I informed

Based on that information— And I had my phone on

18

a speaker phone where Mrs. Snitchler could also hear this

19

person.

20

the conclusion that there was no alternative, that both

21

parties either had to accept the lump sum benefit or both

22

parties had to accept the monthly benefit, that one party

23

could not pull out the lump sum and then the secondary party

24

or the spouse party go on with her benefits.

25

understanding that upon acceptance of the lump sum benefit,

Based on the information that I received, I came to

But it was my

1

there were no further benefits.

2

parties dealing with back and forth and had Mrs. Snitchler

3

hear that, and was satisfied that's what they told us.

4

Q

And I inquired with the

And was it then based upon that understanding that

5

both you and Mrs. Snitchler signed the new stipulation

6

providing for a $8100 lump sum payment to her in exchange for

7

any other claim to monthly payments?

8
9

A

Yeah.

My recollection is that after that

conversation, that I had a brief conversation with Mr. Hughes

10

wherein I think I informed him of the information I had

11

received from Washington.

12

information, the original stipulation which he had sent me

13

stating that Mr. Montgomery would receive the lump sum and it

14

would not affect her monthly, that they would not go along

15

with that.

16

And that based upon that

And then it's my recollection that after having

17

that information, that is when the second stipulation which

18

you've not presented in evidence was given to me.

19

Mrs. Snitchler and I sat down and discussed it.

20

explained to her that "It's my understanding that if you go

21

with the lump sum, neither one of you will receive any

22

monthly payments, that they make you go strictly one way or

23

the other and that we don't have any alternative."

24
25

And then

And I

And my recollection is she says "Well, if that is
the case, he had consented for me to take out my lump sum.

I

1

feel that Ifm sort of honored-bound to let him do it. "

2

But I was very concerned about exchanging $8100

3

cash for $400 a month for so long as his retirement could

4

continue.

5
6
7

Q

In fact, alternately a stipulation was signed, was

it not?
A

Yes.

A second stipulation was prepared by

8

Mr. Hughes, was sent to my office.

I reviewed it, and that

9

stipulation was prepared in accordance with the information

10

that Washington had provided me and of which information I

11

had also informed Mr. Hughes, I believe, before that

12

stipulation was prepared.

13

Q

14

Okay.

Presumably that stipulation is in the file.

Mr. Kunz, had you known that in addition to

15

receiving the lump sum payment benefit Mr. Montgomery would

16

have been entitled to go on receiving monthly retirement

17

payments, would you have agreed to sign the stipulation along

18

with Mrs. Snitchler?

19

A

No.

I never would have recommended that she sign

20

it because I was very disturbed and she was very disturbed.

21

We just couldn't reconcile the mathmatics of it of 8100 as

22

against 400 a month, you know, maybe for life.

23

And then when she came in later and told me she

24

hadn't received it, that's when I told her that I recommended

25

that she see you or someone that had dealt with these orders

1
2

and was maybe familiar with them.
Q

3

Thank you.
I would move for admission of Exhibit 1.

4

MR. HUGHES:

5

THE COURT:

6
7

No objection, your Honor.
It may be admitted.

(Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was admitted.)
MR. FLORENCE:

I have no further questions of Mr. Kunz.

8
9
10

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. HUGHES:
Q

If I understand what you've indicated to

11

Mr. Florence, the difference between the first stipulation

12

and the second one is the first one says that Mrs. Snitchler

13

waives her right to anything in the lump sum but is going to

14

get a payment as an annuity later on.

15

ultimately signed, she waived her rights in the annuity and

16

takes the lump sum in the percentage.

17

fundemental difference between the two?

And the one that was

Is that the

18

A

That's the fundemental difference between the two.

19

Q

Let me show you what I've had marked as Defendant's

20

Exhibit Number 1.

21

indicate to you that she had previous to coming to you had

22

entered and signed an agreement on behalf of Mr. Montgomery?

23

A

No.

Did your client ever show you that or

I have never seen the document which you

24

present to me before.

My client had told me that she had

25

made a commitment in regard to the lump sum.

1

A

No, I didn't. After she married, I don't recall,

2

it was right after she turned 55, she called me to sign a

3

document to obtain her lump sum*

4

it was around '87, she says —

5

document so I can obtain my lump sum,"

6

at that time.

7

retirement come about —

8
9

Q

And at that time, I think

I says "Well, if you'll sign
She said she wouldn'

So I just dropped the issue.

Let me before you get to that.

Then this early

Have you ever

signed anything on her behalf?

10

A

No, I haven't.

11

Q

Do you know how she would obtain that without your

12

signature?

13

A

I do not know.

14

Q

Did you at some point learn that if you were going

15

to take a lump sum option that was going to terminate as of

16

December 1st, 1990, that you had to retire before December

17

1st?

18

A

No, never.

19

Q

No.

20
21
22
23
24
25

Did you ever learn there was going to be a

cutoff, the government was going to cut off as an option —
A

Yes. As of the 1st of December, 1990.

That was

the last lump sum payments they were going td authorize.
Q

And in 1989, did you approach Mrs. Snitchler to

execute the documents to allow you to do that?
A

Yes.
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page; is that correct?
A

Yes.

MR. HUGHES:

I would move for admission of Exhibit

Number 1, your Honor.
MR. FLORENCE:
THE COURT:

No objection.

It may be admitted.

(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit 1 was admitted.)
Q

(By Mr. Hughes)

Now, you heard Mr. Kunz discuss

the negotiations that went on.

Did you approach me sometime

in July or August about changing the qualified domestic
relations order to allow you to do the lump sum?
A

Well, yes.

Q

Okay.

And why did —

Why wasn't this document

Number 1 enough?
A

O.P.M. sent back a letter and said I had to modify

the divorce decree, existing decree, to allow it.
Q

You have had to change the domestic relations they

A

Yes.

Q

And you heard Mr. Kunz testify that the first set

had?

of documents sent over let you take the 400 sum —
$400 out of the other.

gave the

But the one we actually signed that

they agreed to she took her percentage of the lump sum and
agreed to waive the rest.

That was your ultimate

understanding and agreement, wasn't it?

£/2 Court Rpnnrtpr

;M

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Okay.

3

It was always the understanding.
Now, you could have worked for 10 more

years, you say?

4

A

I could have worked indefinitely, actually.

5

Q

Now, you've explained to me a couple' times. Would

6

you do that to the Court why would you have worked 10 more

7

years?

8

A

9

I retired early though I was of age, and I was

allowed 60 percent what they call —

I could have worked

10

until I built up to 82 percent.

11

82 percent of my total retirement at 2 percent a year, so I

12

had to work another 10 or 11 years at that time.

That would have given me

13

Q

And that —

14

A

That's what I advised her.

15

Q

That between the 60 percent and the 82 percent was

16

$400 a month approximately, isn't it?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Is that how you calculated that, to pay her $400 a

19

month and meet your living expenses, you would have to work

20

that additional 10 years?

21
22

A

Yes.

Q

Was that part of your discussions with her, that

23

she could get the lump sum now or she's going to have to wait

24

to get anything until the 10 years run?

25

A

Yes, totally.

The children understand.

I just

i

I "Defendant."

2
3

A

funds to the plaintiff."

4

Q

5

A

6

"Defendant by agreement signed the release of said

Okay.

Thank you.

I agreed that she could take her 6- or 7- or 8,000.

I don't know how much she got in a lump sum.

7

Q

Now, when she signed the agreement for you to get

8

your lump sum payment, that which has been marked as the

9

second sheet in Defendant's Exhibit 1, that was dated, was it

10

not, on October the 10th of 1989?

11

A

October 9th actually.

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

Well, the notary.

14

That's your signature there?
She put the wrong date down.

I

don't know what her problem was.

15

Q

In any event, that was signed in 1989?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Now, the lump sum benefits and the amounts and the

18

annuities that's attached to that, those weren't provided

19

until March of 1991, were they?

20

those figures and those amounts or even that they existed in

21

1989.

22
23
24
25

A

She couldn't have known

She received the same information that I did to get

her retirement.
Q

Tell me, Mr. Montgomery, how she can sign a

document in 1989 and know what's contained in a document
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28

1

A

Yes.

We met there, and he told me that he wanted

2

to get his lump sum if I agreed on it.

3

fought for my lump sum —

4

anything for it.

5

I needed, umm, witnesses that he refused to sign it and so

6

on.

7

have that notarized.

8

signature.

9

Now, since I had

In fact, he didn't ever sign

And I have a stack of papers this big that

And I had to go through all that trouble, and I had to

Q

So I did get my lump sum without his

Let me show you on the document there that you've

10

signed.

I presume you got page 1 as part of the packet of

11

materials?

12

A

No, I don't have it.

And when we were at the

13

credit union dated the 10th of October in '89, I asked them

14

if I could have a copy of it.

15

was going to copy it, and he ripped it out of her hands.

16

don't have anything.

17

either.

18
19

Q

All right.

I

And he would not let me have it,

So you're saying that since that time,

you've never seen a copy of this kind of agreement?

20

A

That's right.

21

Q

All right.

22

And the lady notary had it and

I won't ask you anymore questions about

that one.

23

You were ultimately informed by your ex-husband

24

that this wasn't sufficient, weren't you, that the actual

25

divorce decree had to have some amendments to it in order to

1

allow him to get the lump sum?

2

A

3

The reason for this paper was that he could receiv

his lump sum just as I, and there was no other comments.

4

Q

But ultimately you learned that that wasn't

5

sufficient, that he couldn't get that lump sum based on that

6

paper?

7

A

I was never concerned about it because that was

8

supposed to be it.

I agreed for him to let him have the lump

9

sum, and that was it.

10

Q

Ultimately you went to Mr. Kunz for what reason?

11

A

Because about half a year after he had retired, I

12

hadn't received anything.

And I was told when I called

13

Washington that he had received half of his lump sum.

14

umm, during

15

Q

I don't want to get ahead.

16

A

During the conversation, it came out that he wasn't

And,

—

17

entitled to any lump sum since I was having a claim on his

18

retirement.

19

Q

20

Let's take it a step at a time.

He retired in

November of 1990?

21

A

'90.

22

Q

I'm asking you about events when you went to see

23

Mr. Kunz in July or August of 1990.

24

I

A

Uh~huh (affirmative).

25

|

Q

When you first went in?

Do you remember that?

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Were you informed or had there had to be some sort

3

of agreement between you and Mr. Montgomery that the judge

4

would sign allowing the government to deal with the

5

retirement?

6

A

Do you remember that?

No.

I was told that since he had already received

7

half of the lump sum, I could not automatically go back to

8

the $400 a month.

9

Q

We're talking about before he retired.

We're

10

talking about before while he's still working, before he

11

received anything back in August of 1990.

12

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

13

Q

Do you remember me mailing you some documents and

14
15

asking you to sign that?
A

16
17

All right.

20
21
22
23

And you took those to Mr. Kunz; is that

correct?

18
19

Yes.

Yes
Q

And in those, then, do you remember ultimately

signing one of those documents that Mr. Kunz and I exchanged?
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q

Let me show you a copy of what's in the file.

The

first paragraph there, it makes a statement that this is an

24

attempt to resolve all of the retirement issues that exist

25

between you and Mr. Montgomery, doesn't it?

can i
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1

A

Yes,

2

Q

And that's what you were negotiating with your

3

ex-husband, wasn't it, a way of getting out of each other's

4

way permanently and forever, that neither one of you were

5

going to come back again?

6

The two of you are going to do this agreement.

7

rights.

8

says, this document?

This is the end of everything.

He gets his, and then you're done.

You get your

That's what it

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

On the next page over there, it indicates that

11

you're going to get the lump sum of 27 percent or

12

approximately $8100 we calculated, but whatever 27 percent

13

comes out.

14

waive any future right to any annuities or any other claims

15

on his benefits of any kind.

16

document, doesn't it?

17
18
19

A

And then it says that's all you get, that you

That's what it says in that

Yes; because all we knew was there was $30,000, and

we didn't know anything more than that.
Q

Did Mr. Montgomery tell you if you weren't willing

20

to do the lump sum, he was probably going to have to work

21

another 10 years to make his lifestyle to meet with what he

22

should be?

23

A

24
25

He mention —

He never mentioned 10 years, but he

said he would have to work a long time.
Q

But you were aware considering this document that
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1

A

Yes; because he wanted his lump sum.

2

MR. HUGHES:

That's all I have of her, your Honor.

3
4
5

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FLORENCE:
Q

Mrs. Snitchler, have you received any retirement

6

benefits by reason of your ex-husband's employment at Hill

7

Air Force Base?

8

A

No.

9

Q

Haven't received monthly payments or any lump sum

10

payments; is that correct?

11

A

No.

12

Q

When he had you sign that paper on October 10th of

13

1989 agreeing to allow him to take the lump sum payment, did

14

you know that in addition to that, he would be receiving

15

approximately $1700 per month as a retirement benefit?

16

A

No, I didn't.

17

Q

Had you known that, would you have signed an

18

agreement waiving any monthly annuity?

19

A

Absolutely not.

20

Q

When he had you sign that document, the document on

21

October 10th, 1989, was this attached to it, any document

22

that explained the alternative annuities and what he would

23

get if he didn't take a lump sum or what he would get if he

24

did take a lump sum?

25

A

The paper in '89?

1

Q

Yes.

2

A

I didn't get to see it.

3
4

sign it, and I never did get a copy or anything.
Q

5

Thank you.
That's all.

6
7
8
9

He held it down so I coul

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HUGHES
Q

You indicated that you did make a complaint to

O.P.M. in Washington, is that correct?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And that's what instigated Mr. Montgomery having t

12
13
14

pay back a part of the claim on his lump sum, wasn't it?
A

I don't know anything about that.

repay it or anything, that's possibly true.

But if he has t
I don't know.

15

Q

You don't want the $8100 now?

16

A

I would like to go back to my $400 a month.

17

MR. HUGHES:

18

MR. FLORENCE:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. HUGHES:

21

MR. FLORENCE:

22

That's all I have, your Honor;

You may step down.
We have nothing further, your Honor.
Can I argue it just very briefly, your

Honor?

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. FLORENCE:

25

Nothing further.

Certainly.
When these folks were divorced, the

divorce decree said the plaintiff, that is, Mrs. Snitchler

1

informed that it was not legal, that you couldn't do both.

2

Mr. Hughes contends those were the two proposals that were

3

available to them.

4

If you look at Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, even if she

5

would have accepted that, she would have been better off than

6

they're trying to make her today.

7

for her one-half of 55 percent of his retirement benefit.

8

we use these figures, he is getting 1776 per month.

9

entitled to one-half of 55 percent or 27 1/2 percent of $1776

That would have preserved

10

which is in excess of $400 per month.

11

per month.

12

If

She is

It is closer to $500

If she would have accepted that, believing that she

13

could have, she would be better off now with that proposal

14

than just walking away with $8100.

15

They didn't because they were informed that it was illegal.

16

Couldn't be done.

17

other.

18

That's better than $8100.

And based upon that, she elected the

We submit that the recalculations must be done.

19

It's too bad that Mr. Montgomery has made that sacrifice, but

20

she has made it, as well.

21

all those years of marriage now just because of his

22

sacrifices, as well.

23

THE COURT:

24
25

She can't be expected to sacrifice

Thank you.

By way of asking a question on Defendant's
Exhibit 1, page 3 at the top, Option A, I take it what that
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1

means, counsel, is that he would have received $1,914 if he

2

had not filed for the alternative annuity; is that correct?

3
4
5

MR. MONTGOMERY:

Yes.

There's a reduced annuity, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

That's what I say.

In other words, as it

6

is, he gets $138 less a month for the right to take $30,000

7

in cash?

8

MR. HUGHES: Right.

9

MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes.

10
11

THE COURT:

The Court will make the following findings

and decision in this matter:

12

And as I am doing so, I won't repeat everything

13

that's been done in the file. We recognize there was a

14

divorce in 1985. We recognize that the plaintiff was to

15

receive some of defendant's retirement based on the Woodward

16

Formula. We recognize that there is a modification that's

17

dated January the 8th of 1986, wherein, that was stated to be

18

$400 per month. We have the November 15th, 1990, document

19

entitled "Stipulation For Qualified Domestic Relations

20

Order."

21

today which is the first proposal that was apparently

22

recently given to her.

23

of August 1990, and that's during the negotiations between

24

she and her attorney Paul Kunz.

25

I also have plaintiff's exhibit from this hearing

it's unsigned but bears a blank date

Apparently, there was some kind of an agreement
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undc was made in 1989, apparently October

2

10th, wherein, they each agreed to cash out their retirement

3

and take a lump sum payment.

4

document, it's listed as Number 3 at the top, but it actually

5

is the second page of Defendant's Exhibit 1, talks about the

6

alternative annuity.

7

Annuity With Lump Sum Payment."

8

In fact, the whole document is blank.

9

there, of course, is the signatures.

Page 3 —

Page 2 of that

And under Option 2, it says ' "Alternate
"Monthly to you" is blank.
The only thing that's
By those signatures,

10

Mrs. Snitchler was agreeing "I freely consent to this

11

alternative annuity election including the level of survivor

12

benefits shown above."

13

benefits shown above.

14

And, of course, there are no survivor
They're all left blank.

So the only thing she was agreeing to at that time

15

according to this document was the alternative election which

16

meant, as we then look at the third page of that same

17

document, it meant monthly if you exercise the regular

18

annuity Option 1A, it sent $1914 a month to the defendant and

19

nothing to the survivor.

20

Going down to Option 2, "Alternative Annuity With

21

Lump Sum Payment" which is what he apparently currently is

22

receiving $1,776 per month with a lump sum entitlement of

23

$29,774.17.

24

The Court recognizes that the plaintiff in signing

25

the stipulation in the file that was actually dated November

^KMij
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1

I 2nd, 1990, did so expecting to receive as the stipulation

2

provided a certain amount from each of those as payments were

3

made.

4

The facts have shown that the defendant received

5

$17,000 and kept the entire amount, that the plaintiff never

6

received anything under it.

7

made, she then became aware that the annuity, the Option 2

8

alternative annuity, was the $29,774 plus $1776 per month.

9

That when inquiries were finally

Now, her former counsel has been before the Court

10

and testified, and he's testified that both he and she

11

understood that the lump sum settlement was the entire

12

benefit the defendant was to receive and that they had agreed

13

to abide by that, which was the 30,000, and she would get

14

$8100 of it.

15

And I think in that process, the defendant

16

deliberately misrepresented to both —

17

the benefit was, and never at any time was it conveyed to the

18

plaintiff what the actual entitlement was, that is, that

19

there was a lump sum payment of the 29,774 plus the $1776 per

20

month.

21

March 14th, 1991, when Mr. Montgomery signs the document at

22

that time agreeing that that's what he is to receive.

23

to the plaintiff what

Apparently that's not even determined until

And I recognize that there is some unfairness in

24

the way I'm ruling to the defendant because he did make a

25

decision to retire early based on the agreement of the
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I plaintiff.

And I don't believe that she can have both the

2

$8500 and the $400 per month.

3

I think she is entitled to and to have the stipulation set

4

aside because of the misrepresentation.

5

always hesitating when we set aside a stipulation because

6

they ought to be upheld whenever possible.

7

circumstances, it can't be, meaning I can't.

8
9

And he did retire early.

And as I do so, it's

But under these

So I think she is entitled to the entire amount of
his lump sum retirement, and she's entitled to what she

10

bargained for which was a certain percentage of his

11

retirement, 27 percent of his retirement.

12

is 1776, and she ought to be willing to settle for that.

13

think the figure is 27 percent of that amount per month.

14

And, of course, that has to begin with the month of

15

December 1990 since that was when the retirement was.

16
17
18

But

And his retirement

That will be the order of the Court.
will draw the order.
MR. FLORENCE:

I

Defendant

Any questions?
The only question I have, your Honor, I'm

19

sure it will take some time to notify the retirement office

20

so that they can begin sending her share directly.

21

ask that Mr. Montgomery be required to reimburse her for the

22

months of December of '90 through such time as that becomes

23

effective, however many months.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. FLORENCE:

We would

That is implied in the order.
Thank you.
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z

I as to the back amounts, how it's going to be paid at this

3

time, but it certainly is on an ongoing basis in the meantime

4

of $400 per month ought to be paid by him beginning with this

5

month,

6

MR. FLORENCE:

7

MR. HUGHES:

My understanding of it it's the

8

misrepresentations?

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. HUGHES:

Thank you.

That's the basis for my ruling, yes.
And he got the lump sum in July and was

11

jumped on by O.P.M. in August.

12

action was filed a few days after he got the notice from

13

O.P.M.

14

a week or so before she was refusing to take it.

15

then until here today that she take that?

16
17

And this action —

present

So we only have that lump sum amount for a matter of

THE COURT:

Yes.

And from

I haven't found that, but I suppose

that's a factual matter that's there.

18

MR. HUGHES:

The misrepresentation will be that he

19

didn't explain to her

20

THE COURT:

—

The misrepresentation goes clear back to the

21

time on October 10th of 1990 when they were signing the

22

agreement where the representation was that the total

23

retirement was $29,774.

24

settlement.

25

percentage of that.

And that was a total lump sum

And so she had a 20 —

%ILJ

in effect, a certain

And that was a misrepresentation.
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All right.
MR. FLORENCE:

That's all.

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.)
* * * * *
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